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Biographical note 
Friedrich August von Hayek, a central figure in twentieth-century economics 
and a representative of the Austrian tradition, 1974 Nobel laureate in eco-
nomics, was born on 8 May 1899, in Vienna, then the capital of the Austro-
Hungarian empire. Following military service as an artillery officer in the First 
World War, Hayek entered the University of Vienna, where he attended the 
lectures of Friedrich von Wieser and obtained doctorates in jurisprudence 
(1921) and political science (1923). After spending a year in New York 
(1923-24), Hayek returned to Vienna where he joined the famous 
Privatseminar conducted by Ludwig von Mises. In 1927 Hayek became the 
first director of the Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research. On an 
invitation from Lionel Robbins, he delivered four lectures entitled ’Prices and 
production’ at the London School of Economics in 1931 and subsequently 
accepted the Tooke Chair. He was a vigorous participant in the heated debates 
that raged in England during the 1930s concerning monetary, capital and 
business cycle theories. Hayek was to become the only intellectual opponent 
of John Maynard Keynes (see Caldwell, 1995). As an outgrowth of his 
participation in the debate over the possibility of economic calculation under 
socialism (Hayek, 1948 [1980], 119-208), the focus of Hayek’s research 
shifted during the late 1930s and early 1940s to the role of knowledge and 
discovery in market processes, and to the methodological underpinnings of 
the Austrian tradition, particularly subjectivism and methodological individu-
alism. In 1950, Hayek moved to the United States, joining the Committee on 
Social Thought at the University of Chicago. His research there engaged the 
broader issues of social, political and legal philosophy. He associated with 
such figures as Frank Knight, Milton Friedman, Aaron Director and, some-
what later, George Stigler. He returned to Europe in 1962, with appointments 
at the University of Freiburg, West Germany, and then, in 1969, at the Univer-
sity of Salzburg, Austria. However, in 1977, Hayek moved back to Freiburg, 
where he died on 23 March 1992. 
Hayek was a prolific author not only in the field of economics but also in 
the fields of political philosophy, psychology, epistemology and legal theory. 
However, his contributions to social and political philosophy and to legal 
theory emerged, to a significant degree, as extensions of his scholarship in the 
field of economics and its methodological foundations. The present entry is 
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In retrospect and with the benefit of hindsight, it is apparent that Hayek’s 
approach to the social sciences is rooted in a physiologically derived episte-
mological basis, the foundation of which he worked out during the 1920s. It 
was further developed in the time thereafter and finally published in 1952 as 
The Sensory Order. Although the book has for a long time been neglected, 
several commentators have recently recognized its importance (Bouillon, 
1991; Streit, 1993; Caldwell, 1997). Hayek himself had already pointed out 
that his work on The Sensory Order had greatly helped him in developing his 
conception of evolution and of a spontaneous order and in analysing the 
methods and limits of our endeavours to explain complex phenomena (Hayek, 
1979, pp. 199-200, fn 26). One of the central arguments of The Sensory 
Order is that our perception of the world around us is theory guided or 
conjectural, in the sense that it is informed by a pre-existing system of 
classification - or set of classificatory dispositions - which is itself the 
product of a kind of ’learning’, the outcome of an evolutionary process that 
can be said to reflect the accumulated ’experience’ of the species. Thus 
Hayek’s views as expounded in The Sensory Order come close to some of the 
tenets of what later became known as ’evolutionary epistemology’. In fact, 
Hayek’s work can be interpreted as a systematic elaboration of the conse-
quences that follow from an evolutionary epistemology for the issue of 
socioeconomic-political organization. His main subject is the social dimen-
sion of the knowledge problem, the problem of social learning; that is, the 
nature of the process by which knowledge is accumulated and utilized in 
society. 
Hayek’s concept of perception as classification has a systematic counter-
part in his concepts of rules and rule-following behaviour (see also Hayek, 
1967, pp. 43-65). Both our perception and our behavioural responses to 
situations are a matter of classification. Both are abstract in the sense that 
we respond not to the unique properties, but to typical features of situations 
with certain kinds of actions. In both realms, learning is a matter of reclas-
sification. If, at the level of our cognitive apparatus, the existing classification 
system generates expectations which are disappointed, there will be a ten-
dency for the mind to reclassify experience. The mind will rearrange sensory 
experiences into new configurations that allow better predictions to be 
made about reality. Those expectations that are ’fit’ tend to survive while 
those that are ’unfit’ tend to be weeded out. This selection process clearly 
has a counterpart operating at the social level. As will be seen, the role of 
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ing of expectations. Rules in effect draw the demarcation line between 
’legitimate’ expectations and ’illegitimate’ expectations, thus defining the 
kind of expectations that can be expected to enjoy social protection. On all 
levels, expectations have a tendency towards coherence and coordination. 
The criterion of fitness is confirmation of expectations as indicated by the 
success of our actions. Expectations more consistent with social reality give 
a competitive advantage to the individuals holding them. Rules are thus 
valued for instrumental reasons. 
To conclude this introductory section about Hayek’s epistemology, The 
Sensory Order constituted Hayek’s decisive step away from standard eco-
nomic theorizing. It marked Hayek’s further movement away from the 
equilibrium and rationality constructs used by economists to understand the 
market order. It paved the way for his rejection of homo economicus and 
ultimately also for the constitutional reorientation of his work, that is, his 
proposal that we examine the role of various institutions in assisting the 
creation, discovery, use, conveyance and conservation of knowledge. The 
mind of the individual described in The Sensory Order is a complex adaptive 
self-organizing neural order. The study of such complex orders led Hayek to 
criticize particular uses of the equilibrium construct in economics and to 
question quantitative economics. The newly acquired philosophy also perme-
ates his mature work on legal theory. As he wrote in volume 3 of Law, 
Legislation and Liberty, Hayek (1979), in a section entitled ’The evolution of 
self-maintaining complex structures’: 
These changes in structure are brought about by their elements possessing such 
regularities of conduct, or such capacities to follow rules, that the result of their 
individual actions will be to restore the order of the whole if it is disturbed by 
external influences. ... 
There is now, in particular, no justification for believing that the search for 
quantitative relationships, which proved so effective for accounting for the inter-
dependence of two or three different variables, can be of much help in the 
explanation of the self-maintaining structures that exist only because of their self-
maintaining attributes. ... In particular, in order to explain the economic aspects 
of large social systems, we have to account for the course of a flowing stream, 
constantly adapting itself as a whole to changes in circumstances of which each 
participant can know only a small fraction, and not for a hypothetical state of 
equilibrium determined by a set of ascertainable data. And the numerical meas-
urements with which the majority of economists are still occupied today may be 
of interest as historical facts ... With the functions of the system these magnitudes 
have evidently very little to do. (pp. 158-9) 
Spontaneous order and the theory of cultural evolution 
The problem of social learning has two aspects which, although they cannot 
be sharply separated, are nevertheless distinct (see also Hayek, 1960, ch. II, 
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cating the fractional knowledge that is dispersed among the individual contem-
poraries in a society. 
This aspect is the subject of Hayek’s theory of the spontaneous order of the 
market which is best known for its emphasis on the capacity of markets to 
utilize dispersed knowledge (Hayek, 1948 [1980], pp. 77-91). On account of 
his work about the social role of prices as carriers of information, allowing 
the specialized knowledge of each individual to be fully incorporated in 
decisions concerning resource allocation, Hayek has been considered a pre-
cursor of the economics of information (Laffont, 1989, p. 68; Landsburg, 
2002, p. 306). Markets are polycentric orders. They can be seen as continu-
ing, open-ended processes of trial-and-error elimination, processes in which 
constantly a multiplicity of independent trials, of conjectural problem solu-
tions are tried out and selected through the choices of market participants. 
Through the interaction of experimental exploration and competitive selec-
tion, markets can be expected to generate a cumulative growth of 
problem-solving knowledge. Hayek’s notion of competition as a ’discovery 
procedure’ (see Hayek, 1978, pp. 179-90) alludes to this role of the market as 
an evolutionary learning process. 
Hayek’s theory of the spontaneous order of the market delivers the insight 
that, if we want to generate in society any particular order of a certain degree 
of complexity, we should look for general rules of conduct which, if followed 
by individuals, would tend to induce that order to form spontaneously. Such a 
spontaneous or polycentric order rests on a ’division of knowledge’ which is 
analogous with the division of labour in classical economic theory. Because 
each individual makes use of his or her specific knowledge in deciding how 
to act, spontaneous orders embody a totality of knowledge that is not known 
to any single mind. Via the insight that a spontaneous order utilizes much 
more knowledge than can possibly be made accessible to any central agent or 
agency, the theory gives us reasons for doubting the ability of governments to 
achieve complex feats of social organization by deliberate planning. At the 
same time the theory amounts to an instrumental justification of a particular 
type of rules. Spontaneous orders emerge out of the interaction of a multip-
licity of elements which, in their responses to their particular environment, 
are governed by certain general rules. The individuals themselves may be 
unable to articulate the rules they follow. However, the rules of just conduct 
on which spontaneous orders rely exhibit certain structural characteristics 
that make them conceptually distinct from rules of organization. They are 
negative, purpose-independent, abstract, universal and permanent (Van den 
Hauwe, 1998, p. 101). The character of these rules will permit the inference 
only of the general features of the overall pattern. The particular content of 
the resulting order will always be dependent on the specific circumstances to 
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more, it should be noted that the specification of the criteria that rules must 
meet in order to allow for the formation of a spontaneous social order re-
mains, equally, very general. In fact, Hayek’s account offers only a very 
general schema which has to be filled in in detail. 
The theory of the market, or the catallaxy, is only one part of Hayek’s idea 
of an evolutionary process of collective learning. The second aspect is con-
cerned with the accumulation and growth of knowledge over time, that is, the 
intertemporal problem of profiting from experiences that previous genera-
tions have had. With regard to the intertemporal dimension of the use-
of-knowledge problem, Hayek has advanced a theory of cultural evolution. 
At the core of this theory is the notion that ’the various institutions and 
habits, tools and methods of doing things, which ... constitute our inherited 
civilization’ (Hayek, 1960, p. 62) have passed ’the slow test of time’ (Hayek, 
1967, p. 111) and can, therefore, be expected to embody the experience of 
generations. They are, as Hayek argues, the ’product of long experimentation 
in the past’ (Hayek, 1978, p. 136) and ’embody the experience of many more 
trials and errors than any individual mind could acquire’ (Hayek, 1967, 
p. 88). What is distinctive in Hayek’s theory is his account of social institu-
tions and rules of conduct as ’bearers of knowledge’ (Kukathas, 1989, p. 220). 
The rules and institutions that define the frameworks within which social 
interactions take place embody knowledge of which we are otherwise una-
ware because they are themselves the outcome of a process of competitive 
selection. The abstract frameworks which contribute to the formation of 
spontaneous orders - basically the rules of the law of property, tort and 
contract (see Hayek, 1976, p. 109) - are thus themselves conceptualized as 
more or less unintended products of an evolutionary process. Thus Hayek 
sees common law both as a codification of previously unarticulated rules of 
conduct and as providing a framework within which spontaneous orders can 
form. 
As Vanberg points out (Vanberg, 1994, passim), Hayek’s theory of cultural 
evolution becomes disputable where it seems to argue that because of our 
’incurable ignorance’ we ought necessarily to rely largely on unquestioned 
traditional rules instead of attempting to choose rationally or to construct the 
system of rules that we want to follow. 
The question of how the different kinds of rules differ in their nature -
rules of conduct versus organizational rules - must be distinguished from the 
question of how they originate - whether they ’spontaneously evolve’ or are 
’deliberately designed’. In a particular sociohistorical situation there may 
exist a de facto correlation between the two aspects, but this need not be so. 
The two dimensions are conceptually distinct. This fact was acknowledged 
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The evolution of common law and the role of the judge 
A central theme in Hayek’s system of thought refers to the interplay between 
the order of rules and the order of actions. Hayek distinguishes between the 
legal framework, upon which the relative certainty of expectations is founded, 
and the system of market exchanges within that framework, in which there is 
no certainty of expectations. Because of the stability of the legal framework, 
agents can rely on expectations regarding the typical form or pattern of 
economic interactions. In contract law, for example, there are criteria for a 
valid contract regardless of the price or nature of the goods exchanged. But 
within this overall pattern equilibrium at the level of legal institutions, there 
is a disequilibrium or continual change in the economic variables. Agents 
will continually change their plans in accordance with new facts about both 
the external world and other agents. In fact, the stable legal framework, in 
facilitating such changes, ensures maximum market coordination. In other 
words, maximum coordination - the highest possible degree of coordination 
- does not necessarily mean a state of full or exact coordination. The very 
process of coordinating must involve a certain amount of (adaptive) 
discoordination. 
Moreover, the stability of the legal framework is not absolute. As will be 
seen, the rules themselves evolve. Hayek’s account of the role of the common 
law judge is very illuminating in this respect. In Hayek’s theory of the 
common law and the role of the judge, the emphasis is on the coordination of 
individual activities through a process of systematic mutual adjustment of 
expectations (Hayek, 1973, p. 86). The function of the judge is to ensure a 
maximal coincidence of (legitimate) expectations, that is, to create a situation 
in which the chance to form correct expectations is as great as possible. But 
the chance of as many expectations as possible being fulfilled will be best 
enhanced if some expectations are allowed to be systematically disappointed. 
Thus the judges, by upholding those rules which make it more likely that 
expectations will match and not conflict, are consciously trying to give greater 
internal coherence to the law. However, they do not need to know anything 
about the nature of the resulting overall order which they serve, beyond the 
fact that the rules are meant to assist the individuals in successfully forming 
expectations in a wide range of circumstances. They are unintentionally 
playing a part in the formation of a spontaneous order: a system of rules of 
conduct conducive to the efficient operation of the order of actions which 
rests on it. The body of the common law constitutes a spontaneous order, 
which evolves as an unintended consequence of the following of meta rules. 
One of the most fundamental meta rules is that, when deciding a difficult 
case, the judge’s task is to try to make the law as a whole a little more 
coherent: he is required to think only about the internal logic of the law. 
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Mansfield, who stressed that the common law ’does not consist of particular 
cases, but of general principles, which are illustrated and explained by those 
cases’, thus highlighting the fact that a law based on precedent is more rather 
than less abstract than one expressed in verbal rules (ibid., p. 86). 
The judge assists in the process of selection of rules. In fact, three distinct 
evolutionary mechanisms are involved in Hayek’s account of the modus 
operandi of the judiciary. If there were no variation, evolution could not get 
started as a result of selection. At first sight, however, there seems to be little 
room for a variation or mutation mechanism in Hayek’s account of the 
judge’s task. The judge will merely assist in ’the process of articulation of 
pre-existing rules’ (ibid., p. 78). The judge ’is committed to upholding the 
principles on which the existing order is based’ (ibid., p. 120). He discovers 
the rules ’presumed to have guided expectations in many similar situations in 
the past’ (ibid., p. 86). The judge ’is not a creator of a new order order but a 
servant endeavouring to maintain and improve the functioning of an existing 
order’ (ibid., p. 119). ’The task of the judge will be to tell [the parties in the 
dispute] what ought to have guided their expectations ... because this was the 
established custom which they ought to have known’ (ibid., p. 87). Thus the 
emphasis is laid on the fact that judges adjudicate particular cases by means 
of custom and precedent. This is what is meant by stare decisis, which can be 
said to account for the transmission or replication mechanism in the evolu-
tion of the law. 
How then does variation arise? ’Experience will often prove that in new 
situations rules which have come to be accepted lead to conflicting expecta-
tions’ (ibid., p. 115). And further: ’ Since new situations in which the established 
rules are not adequate will constantly arise, the task of preventing conflict 
and enhancing the compatibility of actions ... is of necessity a never-ending 
one, requiring ... the formulation of new rules necessary for the preservation 
of the order of actions’ (ibid., p. 119). Thus variation is generated. However, 
’This will in some measure always be an experimental process, since the 
judge ... will never be able to foresee all the consequences of the rule he lays 
down, and will often fail in his endeavour to reduce the sources of conflicts of 
expectations’ (ibid., p. 102); and: ’The judge may err’ (ibid., p. 119). 
By what mechanism are errors, that is, unfit rules, eliminated? 
[It is] only by their effects on that order of actions, effects which will be discov-
ered only by trial and error, that the adequacy or inadequacy of the rules can be 
judged. (Ibid., p. 102) 
Like most other intellectual tasks, that of the judge is ... one of testing hypotheses 
at which he has arrived by processes only in part conscious. ... he must stand by 
his decision only if he can rationally defend it against all objections that can be 
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As in all other fields advance is here achieved by our moving within an existing 
system of thought and endeavouring by a process of piecemeal tinkering, or 
’immanent criticism’, to make the whole more consistent both internally as well 
as with the facts to which the rules are applied. (Ibid., p. 118) 
Thus a learning process of trial-and-error elimination accounts for the 
selection mechanism. 
Law and legislation 
Hayek clearly recognized that ’the spontaneous process of growth may lead 
into an impasse from which it cannot extricate itself by its own forces’ (ibid., 
p. 88). It is therefore acknowledged that ’grown’ law may require correction 
by legislation. It seems that legislation may be required both to generate 
novelty - that is, legislation works as a mutation mechanism - and to elimi-
nate errors in past developments - that is, it also works as a selection 
mechanism. 
The insight that spontaneous growth will not necessarily operate to gener-
ate efficient results is corroborated by the game-theoretic analysis of invisible 
hand processes. The institutions that develop may be suboptimal in nature 
and they need not be efficient to persist. For example, in impure coordination 
games, the players may get stuck in a self-enforcing Nash equilibrium that is 
not Pareto efficient and thus suboptimal self-sustaining conventions may 
evolve (Van den Hauwe, 1998, p. 111). 
The rule of law 
Hayek undertakes to show that the operation of the market leads not only to 
the creation of an order, but also to a great increase of the return which men 
receive from their efforts. ’The game of catallaxy’ is ’a wealth-creating game 
(and not what game theory calls a zero-sum game), that is, one that leads to 
an increase of the stream of goods and of the prospects of all participants to 
satisfy their needs’ (Hayek, 1976, p. 115). However, the tendency of the 
market to promote welfare is subject to some qualifications. Hayek accepts 
that the state should provide a safety net of social security provision for the 
very poor, that it should finance the supply of certain public goods, and that it 
should impose regulations to control negative externalities. Since, on Hayek’s 
argument, the monopoly on coercion is to be centralized in the hands of 
government, that is, essentially a monocentric organization, it is crucial that 
this immense power should not be misused. Government must therefore itself 
be constrained by general rules, or by what Hayek calls the ’Rule of Law’. 
Hayek’s doctrine of the Rule of Law is a meta-legal doctrine - a political 
ideal - a set of standards against which we can judge any laws, regardless of 
their particular content. The guiding idea is that interventions should, as far 
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to everyone and which must be known and certain. In The Constitution of 
Liberty (Hayek, 1960), Hayek traces the history of the Rule of Law tradition. 
Moreover, he sets himself the task of answering the question of what liberal-
ism means ’when applied to the concrete problems of our time’ (ibid., p. 3). 
He examines the problems, among others, of welfare statism, labour unions, 
taxation and transfer payments, money, housing and town planning, agricul-
ture and natural resources, education and research, and ’neighbourhood effects’. 
This book, in which Hayek developed the ethical, anthropological, legal and 
economic bases of a liberal economic and social order, is by some considered 
his magnum opus. 
In conclusion, it should be clearly understood that through the theory of 
polycentric or spontaneous orders Hayek grounds the political ideal of the 
Rule of Law ’positively’, that is, on an empirical-scientific basis and not on 
arbitrary metaphysics. 
Proposal for constitutional reform 
Hayek became increasingly concerned about the problem of controlling the 
growth of government. The problem was raised as early as in his The Road to 
Serfdom (Hayek, 1944). This concern finally led him to question democracy 
as it now exists: the kind of democracy based solely on the principle of 
majority rule, which has gradually been transformed into a new kind of 
despotism and under which legislative and administrative powers are increas-
ingly confused. On one hand, omnipotent democracy is quite strong since the 
individual can hardly escape from its far-reaching coercive power; on the 
other, however, it is rather weak in that it easily succumbs to the pressure of 
special-interest groups. Hayek had been particularly impressed by Mancur 
Olson’s (Olson, 1965 [1971]) description of the mechanism of the process of 
government by coalitions of organized interests and of the tendency towards 
a persistent exploitation of unorganized and unorganizable groups by organ-
ized group interests (Hayek, 1979, pp. 97, 143). Through this analysis, Hayek 
came to propose a model of an ideal constitution along the following lines 
(ibid., pp. 105-27). 
The task of stating the general rules of just conduct, the rules of action that 
are followed only to preserve the social order and not to achieve specific 
targets, would be entrusted to a legislative assembly, the composition of 
which is different from the governmental assembly entrusted with the task of 
government. The coercive powers of the latter assembly would be limited by 
the rules of justice laid down by the first. Thus a true separation of powers 
would be achieved. The basic clause of such a constitution would have to 
state that in normal times men could be restrained from doing what they 
wished, or coerced to do particular things, only in accordance with the 
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domain of each. Practical difficulties are worked out through a special consti-
tutional court. 
An application of Hayekian law and economics: the comparative 
analysis of alternative monetary and banking regimes 
It is Hayek’s emphasis on the theme of the interrelation between the system 
of rules and its systematic outcome at the level of the order of actions that 
qualifies him as a law and economics theorist (see also Hayek, 1967, pp. 66-
81). Hayek views the economic problem of society as essentially a coordination 
problem: 
The essential problem remains that of whether the plans of different individuals 
will tally and will accordingly all stand a chance of being successful, or whether 
the present situation carries the seed of inevitable disappointment to some, which 
will make it necessary for them to change their plans. (Hayek, 1941, p. 22) 
Thus in a sense the theme of the interplay between institutional structure 
and economic order was, at least implicitly, already touched upon in Hayek’s 
early economic work on business cycle theory. Business cycles are instances 
of how an economy can suffer coordination failures on economy-wide scale. 
In the so-called ’Austrian’ theory of the trade cycle (Hayek, 1935 [1967]), the 
boom is a self-reversing process set into motion by monetary expansion 
brought about by the central bank, which is essentially a governmental bank. 
If the banks were truly competitive, the business cycle would never get under 
way. 
It had long been recognized that the Austrian theory of the business cycle 
embraces a constitutional perspective with respect to monetary problems: the 
search is not so much for a proper policy but for an appropriate monetary 
framework. The cycle depends on the elasticity of bank credit, that is, the 
characteristic of a developed financial system that allows the supply of money 
credit to differ from the supply of credit based on real saving.
2 Economists 
may study different institutional arrangements in order to determine which 
type of institution is most likely to minimize the tendency for the market rate 
of interest to be reduced below the natural rate. Monetary and banking 
arrangements will acquire particular significance in this respect. 
As Vera C. Smith reminds us: 
Any attempt to make a final evaluation of the relative merits of alternative systems 
of banking must look primarily to the tendencies they manifest towards instability, 
or more particularly to the amount of causal influence they exert in cyclical 
fluctuations. Most modern theories of the trade cycle seek the originating force of 
booms and depressions in credit expansions and contractions with the banks as the 
engineering agencies. (Smith, 1936 [1990], pp. 192-3) Friedrich August von Hayek (1899-1992)    555 
Hayek, however, never endorsed free banking in his early economic writ-
ings, despite his general emphasis on the coordinating properties of market 
competition. Hayek believed that the impulse initiating unsustainable cycli-
cal booms was often the failure of the market rate of interest to rise with the 
equilibrium or natural rate when the demand for loanable funds increased. To 
explain why the market rate failed to rise, Hayek elaborated Thomas Joplin’s 
argument as to how commercial banks responded to an increase in loan 
demand by varying only the quantity of loans and not the price (Hayek, 1935 
[1967], pp. 15-17); in other words, the argument is built on the assumption 
that the short-run supply of bank loans is perfectly elastic at the prevailing 
rate of interest (Hayek, 1933 [1966], pp. 171-3; White, 1999b). 
Therefore a useful central bank, Hayek advised, ’will have to act persist-
ently against the trend of the movement of credit in the country, to contract 
the credit basis when the superstructure tends to expand and to expand the 
former when the latter tends to contract’ (Hayek, 1937 [1989], pp. 89-90). 
Hayek’s later ’The denationalisation of money’ (Hayek, 1978 [1991]) con-
stituted a radical policy departure from his earlier support for central banking. 
Hayek, following up on an earlier suggestion by Benjamin Klein (1974), now 
envisaged a market in which all issuers, public and private, would offer non-
redeemable currencies, each currency constituting its own monetary standard. 
Each private issuer would pledge to maintain purchasing-power stability in 
terms of a particular basket of goods, but this pledge would not take the form 
of an enforceable redemption contract. Thus, and consistent with his early 
scepticism toward free banking, Hayek did not suggest free competition 
among banks offering wholly or fractionally backed liabilities redeemable for 
a commodity money. 
Although Hayek’s proposal with regard to the denationalisation of money 
has not been exempt from serious criticism,
3 it has led to a variety of proposals 
for fundamental financial and monetary reform. The development of a 
contemporaneous free banking school in economics has thus been stimulated 
(White, 1984 [1995]; Selgin, 1988; Salin 1998). The advocates of fractional 
reserve free banking believe that one of the desirable macroeconomic charac-
teristics this system would exhibit is the avoidance, or at least the limitation 
of Hayekian cycles. Monetary economists Greenfield and Yeager (1983) on 
the other hand have proposed a multi-commodity standard involving a sepa-
ration of the medium of account from the medium of redemption, a system 
which, as these authors believe, would foster price level stability and the 
avoidance of monetary disequilibrium. More recently the search for institu-
tional alternatives in the domain of money and banking has also led to the 
development of law-based macroeconomics, a project which culminates in a 
consistent argument for a return to a 100 percent reserve requirement in 
banking (Jesœs Huerta de Soto, 1998).
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Notes 
1.  For a more complete intellectual biography of F.A. Hayek, see now Hennecke (2000). 
2.  Several excellent accounts of the theory of the business cycle are available; reference is 
here made to Garrison (2001) and Skousen (1990). The theory was originally conceived in 
Mises (1912 [1981], pp. 377-404). Mises’s achievement resulted from the integration of 
different strands of thought: he essentially combined B￿hm-Bawerk’s capital theory and 
Wicksell’s interest rate mechanism with his own sequence analysis of monetary forces. The 
theory highlights how changes in the market for loanable funds lead to capital restructur 
ing, and how changes emanating from some sources can lead to unsustainable capital 
structures that will inevitably require a later correction. An artificial boom is an instance in 
which the change in the interest rate signal as a result of credit expansion and the change in 
resource availabilities are at odds with one another. With seemingly favourable credit condi 
tions, long-term investment projects are being initiated at the same time that the resources 
needed to see them through to completion are being consumed. As the market guides these 
projects into their intermediate and late stages, the underlying economic realities become 
increasingly clear. The sequence of malinvestment and overconsumption, followed by 
crisis, liquidation and unemployment characterizes the intertemporal disequilibrium that is 
summarily described as a business cycle. 
3.  More particularly, and in light of the general problem of time-inconsistency identified by 
macroeconomists the question can be raised of whether the keeping of such a nonenforceable 
pledge would be consistent with profit maximization. A profit-maximizing fiat-type issuer 
could choose to hyperinflate its own brand of money, and would do so if staying in business 
promised less than the one-shot profit available from an unanticipated hyperinflation (White 
1999c, 227 ff.). Moreover, the feasibility of private fiat-type money may be doubtful in 
view of the money regression theorem; on the latter, see Mises (1912 [1981], pp. 129-46) 
and Selgin (1994, pp. 809-11). 
4.  Jesœs Huerta de Soto (1998) basically demonstrates that Hayek’s business cycle theory can 
be integrated with his legal theory, his constitutional economics and his spontaneous order 
paradigm. This accomplishment raises doubts as to the merits of the thesis of an author like 
Witt (1997) who argues that the distinction between Hayek’s early investigations into price 
theory, capital theory, and theory of the business cycle prior to and during his time at the 
London School of Economics (Hayek I) and, thereafter, his work on social philosophy, 
spontaneous economic order, and societal evolution (Hayek II) is one between two differ 
ent and basically incompatible research programmes pursued consecutively by Hayek. It is 
nevertheless correct that Hayek himself never reconsidered the theory of business cycles 
from the perspective of his later work. The comparative institutional approach to the study 
of business cycles is also embraced in Van den Hauwe (2005). 
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